## Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||

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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-21