Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
David Wiggins on Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 289f Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: ( 4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]. II 292 Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity. Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work. >Possible worlds, >Saul A. Kripke. --- Simons I 115 Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). >Tibbles-Example. N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail). Although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. Process: cannot be split. >Process. There is a difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object. >Modalities, >de re, >Four-dimensionalism. Therefore QuineVsModality de re. Here sum and process differ, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects. >Mereological sum._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19