Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity theory (philosophy of the mind): the thesis that mind states are nothing but states of the brain. Types of identity theory are the weaker assumption of a type-type identity and the stronger assumption of a token-token identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Identity Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 54 KripkeVsIdentity Theory: if it was true that C-fiber stimulation is pain, then the identity would be necessary - such as the one from heat and molecular motion. But it does not seem to apply, that pain is necessarily a certain brain state. Kripke: objection of common sense (Butler): nothing mental can be equated with anything non-mental, without skipping the mental. SearleVsKripke: Kripke is still a dualist. >Dualism, >Monism, >Identity. I 56 Token/token-identity theory/(Lewis)/Searle: cannot say as a materialist, that the commonality of people who believe that Denver is the capital of Colorado, is precisely this intellectual property because the materialist denies this. Solution: is the function of neurophysiological state. Cf. >Type/Token-Identity, >Materialism. I 56 SearleVsIdentity Theory: the identity theory skips the mind. The mind is just there, and no problem at all. LeibnizVsIdentity Theory: not all properties are identical: some are just physical, some mental. >Leibniz-primciple._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Identity Theory
