Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Paradox of implication: A statement is true according to the standard definition of implication, when the antecedent of the implication is false. In any case then the consequent of the implication is (trivially) true. See also Ex falso quodlibet/EFQ, Implication, Paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David M. Armstrong on Implication Paradox - Dictionary of Arguments
III 19 Paradox of implication/solution/Armstrong: Univesal Quantifikation: says something about every thing: even if there is no Q: "either there or it is not an F that is a G (>Empty description). Problem: the term of a positive antecedent syntactically difficult to define. - Nevertheless e.g., "being a centaur": this is semantically and syntactically clear._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |