Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Individuals: In philosophy, individuals are entities that are distinct from other entities. They are typically characterized by their own unique properties and experiences. Individuals can be physical objects, such as humans, animals, and plants, or they can be non-physical objects, such as minds, souls, and thoughts. See also Particulars, Individuation. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Individuals - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 40 Individual/Lewis: can e.g. be the union of myself and all my counterparts - that is a mereological sum. - On the other hand: something else: a cross world individual that is a maximum counterpart-related sum of possible individuals, of whom I am one. It’s only forbidden that an individual is entirely in several worlds - therefore there could be modal continuants. (Lewis ultimately Vs). >Counterparts/Lewis, >">Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis, >Continuants/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 60 Individual/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): points in time and space and space-time points are not individuals. - E.g. Leibniz: it is pointless to imagine the whole world moved three feet to the left. E.g. ((s) if it was now 5 o’clock instead of 6 o’clock, it would only be a different name.) - If time was to be lost, then there would have to be other processes, which would not be affected by the "jump", then shifting of processes, not of points in time - ((s)> Davidson:> "If everything was different...", >Skepticism/Davidson). - ((s) pointless: e.g. "this point in space is different".) - It only makes sense: this object is somewhere else, then show object, not point to point in room. Pointless: this space-time point could have been different. - But makes sense: "this object could have been somewhere else."_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Individuals
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20