Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
David B. Kaplan on Content - Dictionary of Arguments
Stalnaker I 206
Content/Kaplan: sentence meaning: does not define the content itself. - Only the context defines it. - Context/Stalnaker: can be represented as centered world.
>Context, >Centered world, >Possible world.
Content/Kaplan: is represented by propositions.
Character/content/Kaplan: character and content need to be separated because the sentence meanings ((s) propositions) do not represent the expressed thoughts .
((s) Because it may be that you do not know which proposition the own sentence expresses.) - ((s) because you do not know the entire context.)
Content/Kaplan: that what is said, the idea, the information the speaker intends to convey.
Knowledge/Proposition: E.g. a doctor leaves on his (own) answering machine the message: "Take two aspirin ..."._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Authors A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z