Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Wilfrid Sellars on Content - Dictionary of Arguments
Content/Sellars: There is a difference of descriptive and propositional content of experience.
Def Descriptive content/Sellars: what is responsible for ensuring that anyone who sees something red, or something that just seems red, will respond with the same words.
Common content/Sellars: The common descriptive content of experiences could be determined, by saying that both were experiences of seeing a red object when their common propositional content were true.
Data: data are empirical.
Content/Sellars: consists in the theoretical entities.
((s) "Theoretical entities" here are not as in most other contexts unobservables like elementary particles. For Sellars' Psychological Nominalism objects are not perceivable as objects unless our concepts are formed.)
>Consciousness/Sellars, >Concepts/Sellars, cf. >Theoretical entities._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977
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