. Robert Stalnaker on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments

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Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefore, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Robert Stalnaker on Intensions - Dictionary of Arguments

I 16
Def C-intension/Jackson: a c-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) This is where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed, which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world), i.e. it is relative to possible worlds.
>Possible worlds
, >Cross world identity.
Def A-intension/Jackson: the A-intension is solely determined by the idea of propositino ((s) what is meant?) (regardless of possible worlds). Then there is a difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements!
Def necessary a posteriori statement: a necessary a posteriori statement is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension.
>Necessity a posteriori.
Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension.
I 205
Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional sentence intension is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value.
Def A-intensions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: A intensions function with one argument and one centered world - their value is a truth value.
Def C-intension/secondary intension/secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: C-intensions function with one argument and one possible world - their value is a truth value.
Cf. >Twodimensional semantics.
I 208
Two-dimensional intension/thought/non-rigid/content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description.
>Thoughts, >Rigidity.
Secondary proposition/Stalnaker: the secondary proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts.
>Content/Stalnaker, >Facts.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-28
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