Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Internal Realism: theory of the Philosopher Hilary Putnam, according to which truth can be attributed to sentences only in the context of a theory or a reference system. Also the question of the reference of the terms used is only useful in the context of a theory. See also reference system, conceptual schema, immanence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hilary Putnam on Internal Realism - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 389 Internal Realism/Putnam: internal realism is an empirical theory - collective spokesperson-behavior. In contrast, metaphysical realism is not empirical, but a model (like billiard balls). VI 400 Internal Realism/Putnam: how a theory "is understood" cannot be discussed within the theory itself. Whether the theory has a clearly intended interpretation, has no absolute sense. Metaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism asks for a theory-independent fact in regards to what a term refers to within a theory. Internal Realism: our use of "cow" assumes that "cow" is understood. This works but only with a verificationist approach of understanding - not with a truth-conditional. Hence, the use is already explained. >Truthconditional semantics, >Verificationism, >Use. --- I (a) 18 Internal Realism/Putnam: (truth relative to a theory): here use and reference are linked. I (e) 151 Internal Realism/PutnamVsDummett: internal realism is related to its anti-realism, but truth is not identified with justification but with an idealization of justification. >Anti-realism, >Justification, >Idealization. Quine: the justification conditions change with our corpus of knowledge. I (f) 156ff Internal Realism/Putnam: the ontology is theory-dependent. Truth: truth has rationalized acceptability. Brains in a vat are not a possible world, because they are only assessable from God's perspective. >Brains in a vat. Observation through a "different world" is excluded by definition. The internal realism recognizes an "internal conceptual scheme", within which objects exist. Internalism: "rabbit" refers just to rabbit. >Conceptual scheme, >Gavagai. I (f) 159 ExternalismVs: externalism does not tell us what reference is. Internalism: tautologies are sufficient for reference (> Meaning Postulates). Causality is irrelevant for reference. "Alien" refers to aliens. ExternalismVs: the meaning arises for us by association with "not from this earth" and that is ultimately causally mediated. E.g. natural type: the natural type is the basic concept for future horses. I (f) 160 InternalismVs"of the same kind": "of the same kind" does not make sense outside of a category system. Everything is kind of the same kind. There are no extra facts that make true that horses are horses, there are just horses. >Natural kinds. VsInternalism: but in this way self-identifying objects are accepted (and the world arranges itself). Putnam: ultimately, there are self-identifying objects, but not in the externalist sense. Solution: objects are made and discovered. Then they have intrinsic labels (but they are not mind-independent)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Internal Realism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24