|Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Theory of Descriptions/SearleVsRussell/McDowell: here it is easy to be on the side of Searle (i.e., to assume intentionality).
McDowellVsSearle: it is better to give up Searle's desire and clarify what the non-obvious descriptions are.
(With Evans): the conceptual area should not be regarded as a "predicative", but as "belonging to the area of Fregean sense".
McDowell Thesis: Fregean sense is effective in the area of reasons. Because rationality is a condition in the community, we do not distinguish between different senses.
But in order to attribute rationality to a subject, we must distinguish between senses (rational and irrational).
VsMcDowell: but then we need some theory of descriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/McDowell: Indirect relation to the world._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,