Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 320
Elimination of singular descriptions/Quine: no more truth value gaps. However all are wrong now: "..y .. and only y" instead of "y = (ix) (x .. ..)" when applicable to nothing.
I 328f
Descriptions can be revived. This is possible in all positions. Socrates is then again definable as a singular term - Quotes: names of linguistic structures - eliminates the characteristic occurrences of the corresponding terms.
- - -
II 75 ff
Russell/Theory of Descriptions: a term is not defined by equivalence but through paraphrase - referring only simulated, not fixed.
- - -
VII (i) 167
Descriptions/Quine: are singular terms.
- - -
III 279
Description/Synonymy/Quine: whether a description assumption is available at all depends on an appropriate translation, and this in turn on the vague concept of synonymy. What is synonymous for us depends on what you first got to know in your individual learning history.
Solution/Quine: we separate logic from empiricism by emphasizing the priority of the predicates: we insist that what we learn through perception is never terms, but only predicates. ((s) We then use these in the descriptions as building blocks.)
III 280
Predicate/Quine: (instead of description) should then only apply to this (shown) object. Then we explain "(ix)Fx" as the actual name, where "F" stands for this basic predicate. That does not even apply to epistemology.
Description/singular term/Quine: then nothing prevents us anymore to regard all singular terms as descriptions! If, for example, "The author of Waverley" is given, we do not need to stop looking for the correct "F" for translation into the "(ix)Fx" description. We allow the following: "(ix)(x is cerberus)" (>unicorn as description).
Any less incompetent translation would only differ in its clarity, not in its meaning.
Singular terms/Quine: treating all as descriptios has the advantage,
III 281
to spare a difference to non-descriptive singular terms. The dispute over descriptions becomes one about predicates.
III 293
Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-22
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