Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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John R. Searle on Descriptions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 43 f "Topic-neutral" (Austin): "topic neutral" is not nomological. SearleVs"topic-neutral": e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately. - - - II 317 Description/Frege: the description delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher). >Definition, >Analyticity, >Sense, >Meaning, >Names. II 319 Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object, e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index, then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear. >Rigidity, >Possible world. - - - V 146 Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem. >Theory of descriptions/Russell. Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description. V 236ff Theory of description/Russell: sentence with description: hidden existence assertion. SearleVsRussell: a propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (the propositional aact is part of the illocutionary act). (s) Reference is not existence assertion. V 240 Searle: from the fact that speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied, e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and does not contain any. Cf. >theory of descriptions, >Speech acts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |