Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Cognition: cognition means processing of information by a human, animal or artificial system. Since information flows through all perceptual organs, uniform processing is to be assumed only on the lowest level of symbols. Examples of cognition are perception, learning, speech recognition, problem solving. Cognitions can run unconsciously.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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John R. Searle on Cognition - Dictionary of Arguments

I 225f
SearleVsCognition: the brain is like a computer: that is not the question but is the mind like a program? No, it is not. But simulation is! The mind has an intrinsical mental content, therefore there is no program.
A program is syntactically or formally defined; the mind has intrinsically spiritual content. It follows immediately from this that the program itself cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of the program does not guarantee the existence of spiritual content by itself. (>Chinese room).
I 226
Church thesis: everything can be simulated on a digital computer, which can be characterized with sufficient precision as a sequence of steps.
Searle: the brain activities can be simulated in the same sense on a digital computer, by also working with weather conditions, the stock exchange or air traffic.
So the question is not: is the mind a program, but is the brain a digital computer?
It could be that states of mind are at least once computational states. That seems to be the view of quite a few people.
I 227
Def Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI): having a mind means having a program, and more is not on the mind.
Def Weak AI: brain processes can be simulated using a computer.
Def Cognitivism: cognitivism is the view that the brain is a digital computer.
I 228
What about semantics? After all, programs are purely syntactic.
Answer of the AI: the development of proof theory has shown that semantic relations can be reflected completely by the syntactic relations that exist between the propositions. And this is exactly what a computer does: it implements evidence theory!
The content of syntactic objects, if any, is irrelevant to how they are processed.
I 229
Note in particular Turing's comparison of conscious program implementation by the human computer and unconscious program implementation by the brain or by a mechanical computer.
Furthermore, note the idea that we might discover programs that we have put into our mechanical computers.
(1) It is often suggested that some dualism is the only alternative to the view that the brain is a digital computer.
(2) It is also assumed that the question of whether brain processes are computational is simply an empirical question.
It is as much to be decided by investigation as the question of whether the heart is a pump or not.
I 230
The question of whether the brain is actually a computer is, in her opinion, just as little a philosophical question as the question of chemical processes.
Searle: for me, this is a mystery: what kind of fact that concerns the brain could make it a computer?
It is assumed that somehow somebody must have done the basic philosophical work of linking mathematics with electrical engineering. But as far as I can see, this is not the case.
There is little theoretical agreement on absolutely fundamental questions: what exactly is a digital computer? >Computer model, >computation.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-09-18
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