Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Cognition: cognition means processing of information by a human, animal or artificial system. Since information flows through all perceptual organs, uniform processing is to be assumed only on the lowest level of symbols. Examples of cognition are perception, learning, speech recognition, problem solving. Cognitions can run unconsciously._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Cognition - Dictionary of Arguments
I 225f SearleVsCognition: the brain is like a computer: that is not the question but is the mind like a program? No, it is not. But simulation is! The mind has an intrinsical mental content, therefore there is no program. A program is syntactically or formally defined; the mind has intrinsically spiritual content. It follows immediately from this that the program itself cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of the program does not guarantee the existence of spiritual content by itself. (>Chinese room), >Mental state/Searle. I 226 Def Strong artificial intelligence/Searle: the mind is like a program. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. Def Weak artificial intelligence: brain processes can be simulated with computers. >Artificial Intelligence. Def Cognitivism: the brain is like a computer. >Computation, >Information processing/Psychology. I 227 Def Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI): having a mind means having a program, and more is not on the mind. Def Weak AI: brain processes can be simulated using a computer. Def Cognitivism: cognitivism is the view that the brain is a digital computer. I 228 What about semantics? After all, programs are purely syntactic. Answer of the AI: the development of proof theory has shown that semantic relations can be reflected completely by the syntactic relations that exist between the propositions. And this is exactly what a computer does: it implements evidence theory! The content of syntactic objects, if any, is irrelevant to how they are processed. >Semantics, >Syntax, >Content, >Proof theory. I 229 Note in particular Turing's comparison of conscious program implementation by the human computer and unconscious program implementation by the brain or by a mechanical computer. Furthermore, note the idea that we might discover programs that we have put into our mechanical computers. (1) It is often suggested that some dualism is the only alternative to the view that the brain is a digital computer. (2) It is also assumed that the question of whether brain processes are computational is simply an empirical question. It is as much to be decided by investigation as the question of whether the heart is a pump or not. I 230 The question of whether the brain is actually a computer is, in her opinion, just as little a philosophical question as the question of chemical processes. Searle: for me, this is a mystery: what kind of fact that concerns the brain could make it a computer? It is assumed that somehow somebody must have done the basic philosophical work of linking mathematics with electrical engineering. But as far as I can see, this is not the case. There is little theoretical agreement on absolutely fundamental questions: what exactly is a digital computer? >Computer model, >computation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19