Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Counterfactual dependency: exists between measured value series and measured facts, e.g. pressure. If the pressures had been different, the measured values would have been different. Double counterfactual dependency exists in the case of control mechanisms, where one automatically reacts to the measured value.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David K. Lewis on Counterfactual Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments

V 33
Counterfactual dependence/Time/Lewis: counterfactually dependent: assumptions about the future - not counterfactual dependence: assumptions about the past - but: if the present was very different, the past would have had to be different somehow! - Lewis: Thesis: yet no strict asymmetry: - E.g. A is not going to ask B for a favor after a dispute - variant: a) if he asks him, there was no dispute - b) there was definitely a fight - backwards causality/past: Problem: counterfactual conditionals/Co.co. are always vague - e.g. Caesar in the Korean War: would have a) detonated the nuclear bomb - b) used a catapult - solution: special form: if A should ask today, there would not have been a controversy yesterday- normal cases in contrast: here there is the asymmetry.
---
V 39f
Alternative/Counterfactual dependence/Causing/Lewis: Analysis 1: Problem: we have to assume a transition period when comparing alternatives. - Because we do not allow jumps - for this transition period the counterfactual dependence does not apply. - Solution: we need an assumption for a certain period of time and a standard solution for vagueness - Analysis 2: comparative similarity of possible worlds - Definition truth/Co.co./Lewis: a Counterfactual Conditional is true if every world that makes the antecedent true also makes the consequent true without leaving the reality for no reason.
---
V 165
Definition counterfactual dependency/Dependent/conD/Lewis: if there is a family of As, A1, A2 and of Cs, C1, C2, ... and if all Counterfactual Conditionals - wA1>wC1, ... wA2>wC2, etc., then the Cs are counterfactually dependent on the As - typical: E.g. measurements and perceptions - E.g. conD, but not causal dependency. E.g. assumed changed laws of gravity with alternative planet movements - because there are no separated events.
---
V 265
Causality/Causal dependency/Separated/Separation/Separatedness/Distinct/Lewis: General: (s) Hume?) causD can only exist between separate entities.) - Solution: Instead, counterfactual dependence: if Socrates had not been conceived, his death would have been impossible.
---
Schwarz I 136
Cause/Causing/Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Schwarz: cD: B is happily cD when probability for B without the occurrence of A would have been significantly lower (relative to a time after the actual occurrence of A). - 137 transitivity: Problem: accident causes recovery - fragility: different standards for effect/Cause: Cause: robust: Later throwing also cause, but effect fragile: someone else throws: this would be a different breaking.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Lewis

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-09-28
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration