Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterfactual dependency: exists between measured value series and measured facts, e.g. pressure. If the pressures had been different, the measured values would have been different. Double counterfactual dependency exists in the case of control mechanisms, where one automatically reacts to the measured value._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Counterfactual Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments
V 33 Counterfactual dependence/Time/Lewis: counterfactually dependent: assumptions about the future - not counterfactual dependence: assumptions about the past - but: if the present was very different, the past would have had to be different somehow! Lewis: Thesis: yet no strict asymmetry: E.g. A is not going to ask B for a favor after a dispute variant: a) if he asks him, there was no dispute b) there was definitely a fight. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactuals/Lewis. Backward causality/past: problem: counterfactual conditionals: are always vague. E.g. Caesar in the Korean War: would have a) detonated the nuclear bomb b) used a catapult. Solution: special form: if A should ask today, there would not have been a controversy yesterday - normal cases in contrast: here there is the asymmetry. V 39f Alternative/Counterfactual dependence/Causing/Lewis: Analysis 1: Problem: we have to assume a transition period when comparing alternatives. - Because we do not allow jumps - for this transition period the counterfactual dependence does not apply. - Solution: we need an assumption for a certain period of time and a standard solution for vagueness - Analysis 2: comparative similarity of possible worlds. >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. Def truth/Lewis: a Counterfactual Conditional is true if every world that makes the antecedent true also makes the consequent true without leaving the reality for no reason. V 165 Def counterfactual dependency/Lewis: if there is a family of As, A1, A2 and of Cs, C1, C2, ... and if all Counterfactual Conditionals - wA1>wC1, ... wA2>wC2, etc., then the Cs are counterfactually dependent on the As - typical: E.g. measurements and perceptions - E.g. conD, but not causal dependency. E.g. assumed changed laws of gravity with alternative planet movements - because there are no separated events. V 265 Causality/Causal dependency/separatedness/separation/Lewis: in general: causal dependence can only exist between separate entities.) >Causal dependence/Lewis. Solution: Instead, counterfactual dependence: if Socrates had not been conceived, his death would have been impossible. --- Schwarz I 136 Cause/Causing/Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Schwarz: cD: B is happily cD when probability for B without the occurrence of A would have been significantly lower (relative to a time after the actual occurrence of A). - 137 transitivity: Problem: accident causes recovery - fragility: different standards for effect/Cause: Cause: robust: Later throwing also cause, but effect fragile: someone else throws: this would be a different breaking._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterfactual Dependence
