Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Counterfactuals: Counterfactuals are hypothetical statements about what would have happened if something had been different. See also Counterfactual conditionals._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Counterfactuals - Dictionary of Arguments
I 60 Kripke: In general, things about a counterfactual situation are not "found out", they are determined. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 63 It is often said that when we describe a counterfactual situation and it cannot result in a purely qualitative one, then mysterious "mere individual things" would be assumed, featureless substrates, on which the properties are based. This is, however, not the case. I 89 Let us assume we use the reference of the name "Hitler" due to the fact that it is the man who killed more Jews than anyone has ever done in history. But in a counterfactual situation in which someone else possessed this bad reputation we would not say that in this other situation the other man would have been Hitler. >Possible world/Kripke. I 93 Counterfactual: even if you say "suppose Hitler had never been born", then the name "Hitler" refers here, and still in a rigid manner, to something that would not exist in the described counterfactual situation. >Names/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke, >Causal theory of reference, >Nonexistence. I 126/27 Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that people would have used in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but a situation is possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Identity/Kripke, >Necessary/Kripke. I 130 ... But this would still not be a situation in which this woman which we call "Elizabeth II" was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. It would be a situation in which there was another woman who had many of the features which actually apply to Elizabeth. The question is: was Elizabeth herself ever born in this possible world? Let us say no. Then Truman and his wife would have a child possessing many of the properties of Elizabeth, but in which Elizabeth herself never existed. >Properties/Kripke, >Designation/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Counterfactuals
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19