Dictionary of Arguments

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Conceptualism, philosophy: the thesis that concepts are constructions of the human mind and, for their part, have no real existence. This also denies the existence of universals. They exist at most as divisions, but not as ideas. See also nominalism, conceptual realism, platonism, universals, ideas.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
XI 136
Intuitionismus/Quine/Lauener: he compares it with ancient conceptualism: universals are created by the mind.
- - -
VII (f) 125
ConceptualismVsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries - Problem: Poincaré's "impredicative" definition: Definition impredicative Definition/Poincaré: the specification of a class through a realm of objects, within which that class is located.
VII (f) 126
Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin.
Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: does not require classes to exist beyond conditions of belonging to elements that can be expressed.
Cantor's proof: would entail something else: It appeals to a class h of those elements of class k which are not elements of the subclasses of k to which they refer.
VII (f) 127
But this is how the class h is specified impredicatively! h is itself one of the partial classes of k.
Thus a theorem of classical mathematics goes overboard in conceptualism.
The same fate strikes Cantor's proof of the existence of supernumerary infinity.
QuineVsConceptualism: this is a welcome relief, but there are problems with much more fundamental and desirable theorems of mathematics: e.g. the proof that every limited sequence of numbers has an upper limit.
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VII (a) 14
Universals Dispute/Middle Ages/Quine: the old groups reappear in modern mathematics:
Realism: Logicism
Conceptualism: Intuitionism
Nominalism: Formalism.
Conceptualism/Middle Ages/Quine: holds on to universals, but as mind-dependent.
ConceptualismVsReduceability Axiom: because the reduceability axiom reintroduces the whole platonistic class logic.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-24
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