Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Forces: A. In physics, a force is an influence that can change an object's velocity, i.e., to accelerate. Forces are vector quantities, meaning they have both magnitude and direction. - B. In philosophy the discussion ist often about the assertive force. Gottlob Frege argued that assertive force is an essential part of the meaning of a sentence, but that it is distinct from the truth conditions of the sentence. The truth conditions of a sentence determine whether it is true or false, while the assertive force determines what the speaker is doing by uttering the sentence. See also Truth conditions, Meaning, Assertions, Speech acts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Forces - Dictionary of Arguments
III 122 Forces/physics/ontology/Armstrong: forces would be non-categorical universals along with categorical and particulars - too complex ontology. Armstrong: also you still need relations - also a relation between force and its actualization. ArmstrongVsTorces. >Relations/Armstrong. - - - II (d) 152 Force/Armstrong: Forces point "behind themselves"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19