# Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Logic - Dictionary of Arguments

II 47ff
Bivalence: Problem: Sorites.
II 53
Bivalence is still a basic feature of our scientific world. - In the liberal sense there is no problem - Frege: each general term is true or not - all terms are vague by ostension. >Sorites
.
II 168
Logic, old: deals with properties - new: with relations - Quine: feels implications.
II 169
Logic, old: failed with relative terms: drawing figures/drawing circles (Carroll) - new: no problem with that: implication lies precisely in the relative term.
II 173
Existence: "all x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? medieval logic: yes
- Modern Times: No (thus gains in symmetry and simplicity).
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VII (e) 82
Logic/Quine: triple: propositions - classes - relations - logical terms: we only need three "ε" ("element of") - Sheffer stroke and universal quantifier.
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VII (f) 119 ff
Class logic/Quine: emerges from quantifier logic if we bind scheme letters (predicate letters) "F" etc. - ((s) 2nd order Logic ).
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IX 8
Logic/Quine: main task: to prove the validity of schemes - 2nd order logic: this is about the validity of the formula schemes of quantifier logic - E.g. substitutability of bi-subjunction:
"x1 ..." xn[((AB) and CA) > CB].
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X 110
Logic/Quine: if you determine the totality of logical truths, you have established the logic.
X 110
Different logic/Quine: there is no differing procedure of taking evidence, but rejection of part of the logic as untrue.
X 111
"Everything could be different"/translation/different logic/interchanging/and/or/key position/ Gavagai/Quine: assuming a heterodox logic, in which the laws of the adjunction now apply to the conjunction, and vice versa - there is a mere change of phonetics or the designation. - ((s) If he says adjunction, he uses our conjunction.) - Quine: we force our logic on him by translating his different way of expressing himself. It is pointless to ask which one is the right conjunction. - There is also no essence of the conjunction beyond the sounds and signs and the laws for its use.
>Gavagai/Quine, >Connectives/Quine, >Schmatic Letters/Quine.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Logic