Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Logical possibility: A logical possibility is a proposition that is not contradicted by any logical laws or axioms. See also Necessity, Possibility, Truth, Statements, Logical constants, Truth values, Valuation, Knowledge, Logic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Logical Possibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I 86 Logical possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong. - (> meaning postulates). - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logical. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates.) ((s)Meaning postulate: this is about the extent of the logic.) I 118 Logical possible/FieldVsKripke: "It is possible that there is an electron": is true in all models, therefore logically true. (> Logical possibility is itself logically true)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Logical Possibility
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-25