Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Multi-valued logic: a logic that assumes more than the two classical truth values true and false. There are trivalent logics with possibility or indeterminacy as a third value. For tetravalent logics there are e.g. ¼ or ¾ as additional values that introduce a gradation in the rating. In the case of infinite-valued logics, the truth values can be interpreted as probability values._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Multi-valued Logic - Dictionary of Arguments
II 108 Trivalent Logic: if B is false but A neither true nor false: then "If A is true then B is true" comes true, although "If A, then B" is not true! Reason: it is only because we assume, as it cannot be denied, that the sentence "A is true" is false if A is neither true nor false. New predicate for trivial axioms: "A is true": shall have the same truth value as A (not always true). II 121 Neither true nor false/Dummett: this is useful only for parts of sentences (clauses)! -> multi-value logic - independently used sentences (not complex): for these only distinction between designated and not designated truth value important. >Truth values/Dummett. - - - III (a) 27f Third truth value/indeterminate truth value/multi-valued logic/Dummett: The "wit" (purpose) is to be able to explain "not" truth-functionally. Truth table with w, f, X. - Difference: without truth value with conditional with a false antecedent: "X" (>designated truth value) - for e.g. unicorn: "Y" (not designated truth value). _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Multi-valued Logic
