. Ludwig Wittgenstein on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments

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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ludwig Wittgenstein on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments

McDowell I 52
If we say that we mean that this is so, we do not stop somewhere before the fact: but we believe that this or that is so and so.
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Nagel I 69/70
The Meaning is a process which accompanied these words. For no process could have the consequences of meaning.
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According to McGinn I 108
Meaning/Wittgenstein: note § 16: the mistake is to say that meaning consists in something.
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Hintikka I 38/39
Meaning/Knowledge/Wittgenstein: but when one says: "How should I know what he means, I only see his signs? so I say: How should he know what he means, he also only has his signs". >Knowledge
"Language can only be explained by speech, so language cannot be explained." (Ms.108, 277f.)
I 266
Meaning/Criterion/Wittgenstein/late: Philosophical Investigations § 146 and § 190: "One can now say how a formula is meant, which transitions are to be made. "What is the criterion for how a formula is meant? For example, the way in which we constantly use them, how we were taught to use them. >Criteria.
I 266/267
It is fundamentally wrong to believe that Wittgenstein used a single "critical relationship" that establishes the link between the meaning and the "criterion" represented by the word. In late philosophy, the term "criterion" suffers the same fate as the term "calculus" or even the term "grammar": it becomes dependent on the language game. >Language game.
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II 212
Meaning/Wittgenstein: "did you mean what you said?" Or, "what did you mean?" Two different uses of "mean".
All kinds of things can justify the claim that you mean what you say, but none of these things need to be a mental process that accompanies the words.
II 317
Imagination/Intention/Meaning/Wittgenstein: it is a deception to believe that what is meant is produced in the mind of the other through an indirect process: through the rule and the examples.
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III 220
Understanding/Wittgenstein/Late/Flor: for this, it is enough to be able to use a word correctly in a given situation. No mental state or psychic process. (The same applies to meaning). >Understanding.
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IV 39
Image/Picture/Similarity/Describing/Meaning/Truth/Negation/Reversal/Tractatus: 4.062 Can't one communicate with false sentences as before with true ones?
No! If by "p" we mean ~p, and it behaves as we mean it, then "p" is true in the new understanding and not wrong.
4.0621 But it is important that the signs "p" and "~p" can say the same thing, because it shows that nothing corresponds to the sign "~" in reality. >Reality.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-05-24
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