|Mentalese: Mentalese is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations simply complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought. J. Fodor Signal language of the brain for internal processing - H. PutnamVs Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. R. SearleVs_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Mentalese/Brain/Brain state/McGinn: Suppose that the brain contains a language, the brain will use it to set up a theory of its own. ((s) as to be able to ever recognize malfunctions, it must be able to compare the desired and actual states.)
See/McGinn: the brain also makes use of an optical theory to interpret the distal importance of a pattern.
McGinn: Thesis: so the brain has certainly the necessary reserves, comprehensive representation areas that are not going to be noticed.
Brain/Mentalese/McGinn: the brain is not subject to the same limitations as the conscious reason. E.g. pain: there may be a subsystem for self-monitoring, which prescribes the pain centers to change the fibers when overloaded. Here semantically mediated feedback loops would obviously be highly useful, the more clever, the better. The dimensions of this cleverness do not coincide with the consciousness._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001