Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mentalism, philosophy of the mind: the assumption that there are inner, mental objects that play causal or functional roles in the formation of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, etc. These roles are rather understood as processes by theories, which are opposed to mentalism. See also intensional objects, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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St. Schiffer on Mentalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I XIX SchifferVsMentalism: language-independent internal entities as objects of belief. Solution: nominalism: Vs internal language-independent entities and Vs facts. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Intensional objects, >Facts. Then we need no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities. No sentential dualism (belief sets as objects). >Dualism, >Beliefs. Schiffer: we tentatively accept a token-token physicalism. >Physicalism, cf. >Token-physicalism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16