Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Mereology: deals with the relationship between parts and the whole and systematizes the relations that can exist between them. A characteristic of mereology versus set theory is the same ontological status of parts and whole in mereology as opposed to the unequal status of set and element in the set theory. Thus, paradoxes can be avoided, such as those known e.g. with the universal-class or universal-set. See also part-of-relation, Russellian paradox, transitivity, extensibility, sum.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David K. Lewis on Mereology - Dictionary of Arguments

Schwarz I 79f
Mereology: quantities are not the sums of their elements - sum of a single thing A is A the thing itself - but the singleton set {A} is never identical with A.
>Singleton, >Unit set.
- - -
IV 44
Counterpart/Couples/Mereology/Lewis: Example twin brothers Dee and Dum in the actual world. Their pair can be seen as a mereological sum.
The couple as mereological sum is a possible individual, not a quantity. Then the counterpart theory can be applied without modification.
- - -
V 258
Event/Mereology/Logic/Part/Logical Relation/Lewis: we have seen that an event in one sense can be part of another event.
1. then, as I suggest, they have a mereology like they all have classes: the parts of classes are the subclasses. (>Subsets).
2. in another sense they have another mereology: regions can be spatiotemporal parts of other regions. Events are classes of regions, the mereology of the elements transfers to the classes, in the sense that events can also be spatiotemporal parts of each other.
V 260
Def Overlap/Event/Mereology/Lewis: two events overlap when they have an event as a common part. An atomistic event has no events except itself as part.
Def mereological sum/event/mereology/Lewis: an event e is the mS of events f1,f2... then and only if e overlaps all and only those events that overlap at least one of the fs.
Principles/Mereology/Event/Lewis: Question: are the principles here
a) the same as that of the unlimited mereology of individuals, in which individual individuals always have a different individual as their sum? Or is it
b) the limited mereology of e.g. chairs, in which several chairs rarely or never have another chair than their sum? (>subset/>Sets.
Lewis: Thesis: Events have a more accessible mereology than e.g. chairs:
For example a war can be a mereological sum of battles,
For example, a conference the sum of its meetings.
But we leave open whether events, however diverse, must always have other events as parts. It depends on whether one allows unlimited sums, so that there is no limit to how large and non-uniform an event may be, or whether one demands a certain unity for it (limited mereological sum).
Perhaps the sum provides a property that is formally suitable for regions, but not an event. This is hard to decide. Our events should serve as causes and effects.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Mereology

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-11-30
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration