Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Modal logic: the modal logic is an extension of classical logic to systems in which possibility and necessity can also be expressed. Different approaches use operators to express "necessary" and "possible", which, depending on the placement within formulas, can let claims of different strengths win. E.g. there is an object which necessarily has the property F/it is necessary that there is an object with the property F. The introduction of possible worlds makes quantification possible for expressing possibility (There is at least one world in which ...) and necessity (For all worlds is valid ...). See also operators, quantifier, completion, range, possible worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Modal Logic - Dictionary of Arguments
II 152 Modal Logic/Quine: The entire modal logic is context-dependent - what is the role of someone or something? It is on the same level as essential properties. (Essentialism). VII (h) 151 Modal Logic/ontology/Quine: instead of Venus as a material object we now have three objects: Venus term, morning star term, evening star term - avoiding opaque contexts: class names as objects rather than classes, numerical names as objects instead of numbers - number concept/number of planets concept: a term is not larger/smaller than another one - reason: necessity is not satisfied by physical objects (> Necessity/Hume). - Necessity/possibility: is only introduced by way of reference, not by the objects - necessity concerns relations, not objects (not existence) - Frege: "sense (meaning) of names" Quine: Problem: individuation requires analyticity and synonymy - E.g. (s) "The term Morning Star necessarily includes the appearance on the morning sky. VII (h) 151f Modal Logic/Quine: makes essentialism necessary, i.e. you cannot do without necessary traits of the objects themselves, because you cannot do without quantification - QuineVsModal Logic: actually there is nothing necessary to the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference. VII (h) 151 Modal Logic/Ontology/Quine: the condition that two names for x must be synonymous is not a condition for objects, but for singular terms - no necessity de re - Venus does not decide about morning star/evening star. - ((s) The conditions are equivalent not the objects. > necessity. VII (h) 154 Modal Logic/Church/Quine: quantified variables should be limited to intensional values - Proposition: complex names of intensional objects - then instead of necessity operator for whole sentences: Necessity predicate is based on complex names ("propositions") - no modal logic in the narrower sense. >Propositions/Quine. VII (h) 154 Modal Logic/Smullyan/Quine: there is a strict separation of proper names and (overt or covert) descriptions - names which denote the same objects are always synonymous (if x = y, then nec. x = y.) - In this case, sentences like (number of the planets = 9) which do not have a substitutable identity must be analyzed by descriptions rather than through proper names (Quine pro). - QuineVs: one must still consider opaque contexts, even if descriptions and other singular terms are eliminated all together. >Proper Names/Quine. VII (h) 154 Modal Logic/Necessity/Planet Example/Quine: the only hope is to accept the situation as described in (33): there are exactly x planets) and still insist that the object x in question is necessarily more than 7! (> Essentialism). - An object itself, regardless by what it is named or not named, must be considered in a way that it has some traits necessarily and others by chance! And notwithstanding the fact that the random traits stem from a way of reference, as well as the necessary ones from other modes of reference - ~nec. [p. (x = x)] where "p" stands for any random truth. VII (h) 156 Modal Logic/Quine: one must accept an Aristotelian essentialism, if one wants to permit quantified modal logic. VII (h) 156 Modal Logic/planet/Quine: the property of being bigger than 9 = the property of being bigger than 9 - but wrong: the property of exceeding the number of planets = the property of being bigger than 9 (s) New: although now the number is the same, the property is not the same - (E.g.) (x = The property of being greater than x = the property to be greater than 9) - any non-truth-functional language leads to opaque contexts. X 107 Modality/modal/Quine: Problem: extension-identical (coextensive) predicates are not interchangeable salva veritate. >Modalities/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |