Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Models, philosophy, logic: A model is obtained when a logical formula provides true statements by inserting objects instead of the free variables. One problem is the exclusion of unintended models. See also model theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Stalnaker on Models - Dictionary of Arguments
I 146 Model/Stalnaker: a model is a pair consisting of an object domain D and a valuation function V. >Valuation function, >Domains. I 149 Model: For our modal predicate logic is then a quadruple ‹W,R,D,v›. D is the range function of W on the sets of individuals. For w ε W, Dw is the range of the world w. Valuation function: the valuation function attributes intensions to descriptive expressions. Intension: the intension here is a function of possible worlds on extensions. >Intensions, >Extensions. Necessity operator: The semantic rule of the necessity operator remains unchanged. >Operators. I 150 The rules for predicate logic are generalizations of the extensional rules. We only add an index for the worlds. E.g. rule for Universal quantification/universal quantifier/Stalnaker: IF Φ has the form ∀F, then is νs w (Φ) = 1 gdw. νs w(F) = D w. otherwise = 0. >Quantification, >Universal quantification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |