Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Semantics of possible worlds: is an expression for a theory that defines sentence meaning as the set of worlds in which this sentence is true. See also possible worlds, rigidity, semantics, propositions, meaning, modal logic, counterpart-theory, modal realism, necessity, possibility._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Possible World Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
II 41 Property/denotation/possible world/possible world semantics/Field: E.g. "Russell is bald" is true in every world w where Russell exists (denoted by "Russell" in the actual world) and where Russell is bald (i.e. has the property for which "bald" stands in the actual world). N.B.: "stand for": we must now understand it like this: a predicate does not stand for a set (its extension), but for a property that exists in the actual world. >Actual world, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Cross world identity, >Modal proprties. Problem: the relation between predicates and properties. >Predicates, >Properties. Problem: Properties determine extensions of the predicates, but are not determined by them. >Extensions. Solution: within the possible world semantics: causal theory of the reference. Problem: we are not coming into contact with all extensions of "bald" Solution: property instead of extension - or the extension is determined by a property. Then what is associated with the predicate is not its extension, but a property. - The relation can be causal or non-causal._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Possible World Semantics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19