|Morals: morals refers to a more or less coded set of rules, action maxims, duties and prohibitions within a society or group. Most of these rules are unconsciously internalized among the members of the society or group. Their justification and the possible assessment of actions are reflected in ethics and meta ethics. See also values, norms, rights, ethics.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Immanuel Kant on Morals - Dictionary of Arguments
Stegmüller IV 299
Morality/ethics/Kant: must necessarily apply. -> categorical imperative - as a hypothetical imperatives ("if you want that, do ...") they would be superfluous.
Stegmüller IV 429
Moral/Kant/Stegmüller: is autonomous: the morally right thing is right in itself and mandatory - it can be detected by practical reason. - Every rational being is competent enough to give the moral commandments themself. - If there was divine reward, morality would be corrupted by self-interest. -> Rawls: the veil of ignorance.
Stegmüller IV 430
God/practical reason/Kant: nevertheless, the moral asks us that we set ourselves the highest good for goal - therefore a cause different from nature must be demanded from nature. - The highest good is only possible in the world, if the highest cause of nature is assumed.
Stegmüller IV 431
In addition, the immortality is necessary so that an infinite progress for the first element of the highest good is possible.
MackieVsKant: this is a false transition from "should" to "should be possible."
Stegmüller IV 433
MackieVsKant: The consistent recognition of the autonomy of moral should have brought him to a more stoic conception: that moral does not need any other bliss as the consciousness of righteousness itself.
Strawson V 134
Moral/Kant: we need that to ensure that the limitations of knowledge do not strengthen the materialism and atheism.
Moral/Kant/Vaihinger: the theoretical reason forbids to accept a moral world order - the practical reason dictates that it is necessary to do good.
Rawls I 251
Moral/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment.
Rawls I 254
Kant/SidgwickVsKant/Sidgwick/Rawls: Sidgwick writes that nothing in Kant's ethics is more striking than the idea that man expresses his true self by acting according to moral law. On the other hand, when he gives in to certain needs, he acts according to the law of nature. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception of Free Will", Mind, vol. 13,1888, pp. 511-516).
Rawls I 255
Kant now, according to Sidgwick, fails to explain why the villain in his bad life does not express himself as much as the saint does in his life.
KantVsSidgwick/KantVsVs/Rawls: Kant should reply that any consistent action according to principles could be the result of a decision of the noumenal self, but that not every action of the phenomenal self reveals this as a free and equal rational being.
RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do.
Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct (see Contract Theory/Rawls), precisely those principles define the moral law.
Rawls I 256
Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt.
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Gadamer I 38
Moral law/"Sittengesetz"/Kant/Gadamer: The application of the moral law to the determination of will is a matter of judgement. But since it is a matter here of discernment under laws of pure practical reason, its task is precisely to protect against the "empiricism of practical reason, which merely places the practical concepts of good and evil in sequences of experience"(1). This is what the typology of pure practical reason does.
In addition, there is certainly also for Kant the question of how the strict laws of pure practical reason can be introduced into the human mind. For this task he indeed relies on common human reason and wants to practice and form practical judgement (...).
Gadamer I 39
But the fact that there can be a culture of moral feeling in this way does not really belong to moral philosophy, and in any case does not concern the foundations of it. For Kant demands that our determination of will should remain determined solely by the driving forces based on the self-legislation of pure practical reason. No mere commonality of feeling can form the basis for it, but only an "albeit dark, but certainly guiding practical act of reason", which is precisely the task of the critique of practical reason to enlighten and consolidate.
1. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1787, S. 124._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977