Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Peter Geach on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
I 46f Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. I 143 Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). But not quantification over it. GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". >Names/Quine, >Descriptions/Quine, >Theory of decriptions/Russell. I 155 Names/Geach: knowing the causal chain is not important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. >Causal theory of names. Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). >Names/Russell. GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". >Knowledge, >Truth. I 162 Quasi-names/Geach: appear in encyclopedias, for foreign gods. - (Geach pro). Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - This is no "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. >Identity criteria, >Objects of belief. I 208 Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. Quasi quotation: is not a name. >Quasi quotation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24