Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
I 36 Names have no sense, descriptions have a sense. >Sense, >Meaning/Kripke. I 39 Name: a name has a different sense, but the same meaning. Alexander was teacher and student... - facts are not part of the sense of the name. I 59 Names are rigid designation expressions (descriptions are not). I 81 KripkeVsMill: ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense. Otherwise we could not understand any sentence in which Socrates appears if we do not know that Socrates means the individual who is called Socrates. >Signs, >Understanding. I 103 Description does not abbreviate the name, e.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel still refers to Goedel. >Description/Kripke. I 118 Russell: logical proper names: identity is without empirical investigation, therefore logical proper names are the only real names. I 136 Name for natural kinds: gold: could turn out to be blue, but would still be gold (would retain existence). >Natural kind/Kripke. I 145 Concepts for natural kinds: are much more closely related to proper names than unusually assumed. I 146 Kripke: general names like "cat" do not express any property. >Properties/Kripke. --- III 362 Names/designate/KripkeVsWallace: not everything has to have a name and not every term is denoted (> Frege: every sentence is denoting: ((s) All sentences with unicorn are false or without truth value). >Unicorn example, >Nonexistence, >Truth value, >Truth value gap. --- Prior I 170 Names/Kripke: names do not have a structure. Simple sentences are wrong if x does not exist. --- Stalnaker I 172f Names/Kripke: reference is the designated object directly, without the mediation of sense. >Reference/Kripke. Frege/Dummett/Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the designated object - otherwise signing out would be inexplicable. Learning a language cannot be explained. >Language acquisition._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20