﻿ Willard Van Orman Quine on Negation - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

# Phylosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
X 113f
Double Negation/Quine: E.g. sentence of the excluded middle/Quine. (1) Every closed sentence is true or false - (2) Every closed sentence or its negation is true. - (3) Every closed sentence is true or not true - multivalent logic: truth value 1, 2, 3: "2" and "3" summarized as "false" - then the negation of 2 and 3 leads to 1 - from 1 to (2 v 3) - Problem: for truth functions we have to decide: the negation always has to lead from 1 to 2 or 3 - then the double negation does not work anymore.
X 111
Deviating Logic/Dialethism/Sentence of the excluded middle/translation/meaning/negation/Quine: some in science reject the sentence of the excluded middle and occasionally consider a sentence and its negation both true.
Vs: as an objection one hears that any conjunction of the form "p.~p" ((s) AZ: when the form is presented) logically implies any sentence. (EFQ). If one now accepts the negation together with the sentence, the distinction would be true/false and thus the whole science.
Solution/VsVs: the contradictions could perhaps be isolated.
QuineVsDialethism/QuineVsPriest: in this dispute, no side knows what they are actually talking about. One only thinks one is talking about negation, i.e. "~" or the sign for "not". In reality, however, the sign "~" has nothing to do with negation if the conjunction "p.~p" is considered true.
QuineVsDeviating Logic: it only changes the subject.
X 118
Adjunction/Negation/logical operators/Quine: are inherent, not transcendent. Because with a deviating logic we cannot maintain its meanings.
Intuitionism: is therefore not a different opinion about the laws for the operators. Rather, he fights them as useless for science.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-27