Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 73 ff Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity! >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Possible worlds. I 157 Necessity/Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein, such logical necessities can always be recognized by the logical form of the sentences concerned. This is represented by purely notation-bound characteristics. "It is the special characteristic of the logical propositions that one can recognize only by their form that they are true." All necessary connections are ultimately tautologies. This sheds a new light on "image theory". I 165/166 Color/Colour Word/Necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colour incompatibility means a violation of Wittgenstein's idea that purely logical needs are the only necessities is now being put in a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of the color terms (or the correct notation). Is a) each individual color represented by a single-digit predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical kind. b) Dots in a color space: then the incompatibilities of the different colors do not cause any non-logical necessities. (Wittgenstein is certainly not familiar with this alternative from Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of colour space. However, one cannot live up to this concept if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates . - - - II 79 Necessity/necessary/Wittgenstein: a necessity in the world corresponds to an arbitrary rule in language. II 134 Necessary/Necessity/Physics/Logic/Wittgenstein: we use the expression both in logic and in physics, because there is a certain analogy between them. II 168 The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". - - - VI 124 WittgensteinVsNecessity/Schulte: the necessity of the logical "must" is only agreement. VI 169 Necessity/Wittgenstein: not for objects, only for terms - not for colours (that there is necessarily still a level between them) but for the representation system (agreement)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Necessity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19