Dictionary of Arguments

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Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 416
Existence/Quine: doubtful: "There are terms that...", "some of these propositions...", "there is something that he doubts...". - Meaningless: talking about two different meanings of "there is" for abstract and concrete objects, but of one single meaning of object.
I 416
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: each behavior is more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore acceptable - but not approved in ontology. - Unlike geometrical object: Position of mass points had no meaning - therefore not individuable, no identity! (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, § 52.)
I 465f
Ontology: in the end only words at all (names of objects) - but accpetance of ideal objects is no linguistic convention.
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II 25
Ontology that consisted only of materials and bodies would be very vague - but precision is just a question of classification.
II 28
Numbers/ontology: Numbers merely "facon de parler". - Higher classes are needed to replace numbers - otherwise there are only physical object.
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VII (a) 15ff
Ontology/Quine: the phrase "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" does not decide between competing O. - We do not consider the variables to find out what there is! - The variable shows what a statement asserts - Problem: I cannot admit that there are things that the other one accepts and I do not. - Deviations in the O involve those in the conceptual scheme - the upper links of the object language can be shared by counterparties and make discussion of language possible. >Semantic ascent/Quine.
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VII (f) 107
Ontology/Translation/Quine: we cannot find ontological definitions for totally foreign languages.
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VII (g) 132
Ontology/Quine: a theory may even include entities that are indefinable in the same theory.
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XII 38
Economical ontology/Quine: predicates instead of properties - sentences instead of propositions.
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XII 75ff
Pythagorean ontology/Pythagorism/Quine: a pythagorean ontology consists only of objects of one type, for example numbers or quantities or bodies. - One could get these with Loewenheim. - Quine: that should be avoided. - Problem: after reduction an infinite range might still remain. - Some numbers lose their number property. - But we do not know which. - Solution: Ontological Relativity: it is useless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms - including that "all are numbers". - Solution: relativistic theory. - Just as there is no absolute location or absolute speed. - Problem: we need to specify a proxy function for a reduction and that is not possible with the axiom of choice (the strong form of Loewenheim). - A proxy function from above-countable to countable range is impossible because of the lack reversibility.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-24
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