Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 416 Existence/Quine: doubtful: "There are terms that...", "some of these propositions...", "there is something that he doubts...". - Meaningless: talking about two different meanings of "there is" for abstract and concrete objects, but of one single meaning of object. >Meaning/Quine. I 416 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: each behavior is more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore acceptable - but not approved in ontology. - Unlike geometrical object: Position of mass points had no meaning - therefore not individuable, no identity! (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, § 52.) I 465f Ontology: in the end only words at all (names of objects) - but accpetance of ideal objects is no linguistic convention. II 25 Ontology that consisted only of materials and bodies would be very vague - but precision is just a question of classification. II 28 Numbers/Ontology: Numbers merely "facon de parler". - Higher classes are needed to replace numbers - otherwise there are only physical object. VII (a) 15ff Ontology/Quine: the phrase "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" does not decide between competing O. - We do not consider the variables to find out what there is! - The variable shows what a statement asserts - Problem: I cannot admit that there are things that the other one accepts and I do not. Deviations in the O involve those in the conceptual scheme - the upper links of the object language can be shared by counterparties and make discussion of language possible. >Semantic ascent/Quine. VII (f) 107 Ontology/Translation/Quine: we cannot find ontological definitions for totally foreign languages. VII (g) 132 Ontology/Quine: a theory may even include entities that are indefinable in the same theory. XII 38 Economical ontology/Quine: predicates instead of properties - sentences instead of propositions. >Predicates/Quine, >Sentences/Quine. XII 75ff Pythagorean Ontology/Pythagorism/Quine: a pythagorean ontology consists only of objects of one type, for example numbers or quantities or bodies. One could get these with Loewenheim. Quine: that should be avoided. Problem: after reduction an infinite range might still remain. Some numbers lose their number property but we do not know which. Solution: Ontological Relativity: it is useless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms including that "all are numbers". Solution: relativistic theory. Just as there is no absolute location or absolute speed. Problem: we need to specify a proxy function for a reduction and that is not possible with the axiom of choice (the strong form of Loewenheim). - A proxy function from above-countable to countable range is impossible because of the lack reversibility._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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