Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
I 33 In epistemological terms, it is laudable to say that the whole of reality is objective, neurobiologically it is simply wrong. >Constructivism. I 40 Ontology/Searle: wrong question: what kinds of things are there in the world? Correct: what must be the case that our empiricism is true? >Empiricism/Searle, >Existence/Searle. I 78f Reducibility is in any case a strange requirement of ontology, because in the past it was considered a classical proof of the non-existence of an entity if one traced it back to something else. >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 118 The ontology of observation, in contrast to its epistemology, is precisely the ontology of subjectivity. I 182 The ontology of unconscious states of mind consists solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena. I 183 This seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, and yet these states have an aspect shape! This contradiction dissolves when we consider the following: The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state that is a possible conscious thought. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts. >Object of thought, >Object of belief, >Intensional object. - - - II 68 Representation: there is no ontology tied to representation. >Representation. - - - V 163 Ontology: main question: are there criteria for ontological prerequisites? >Criteria. V 164 Existence/Quine: to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable. Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and meaningless. Alternative criterion: a theory presupposes and only the entities that it says exist. (This does not have to be done explicitly.) V 165 Ontology/Searle: one notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not be derived from it. It is also possible that there is no translation procedure to determine which statement is the simpler or better one. SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion, two statements that actually include the same prerequisites would include different prerequisites! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine). >Ontology/Quine. - - - Stalnaker I 181 Ontology/language/metaphysics/Searle: one may not draw ontological conclusions from linguistic theories. >Identification principle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19