Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Opacity, philosophy: also opacity of the reference. A problem with propositions (meanings of uttered sentences related to a speaker) is that one cannot be certain that one knows what an utterance refers to. E.g. in an empty room is a blackboard with the inscription "I am hungry". See also intensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, reference, inscrutability, quotation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Opacity - Dictionary of Arguments
III 334 Transparency/opacity/substitutional quantification/Kripke: the opacity is irrelevant here because the point of the traditional view of substitutional quantification is that one can quantify with substitutional quantification into opaque contexts. >Substitutional quantification, cf. >Referential quantification, >Denotation/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke. III 353 Opacity/denotation/Kripke: e.g. autonymous interpretation: every term denotes itself, so opacity is excluded since no two terms are codesignative. III 372 Substitutional quantification/Quine/Kripke: the substitutional quantification even allows quantification into opaque contexts. Single ontology: the single ontology is one of expressions ((s) not of objects). >Ontological commitment/Kripke, >Ontology/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19