Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Ostension: is the pointing to objects for the purpose of definition or description. A known problem is the indeterminacy or lack of uniqueness of the reference in pointing. For example, an object, its form, its nature, its history, its weight, etc., can be meant. See also Gavagai, pointing, to mean, indicative definition, definition, definability, statue/clay.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Ludwig Wittgenstein on Ostension - Dictionary of Arguments

Graeser I 58f
Meaning/Wittgenstein: "What is meaning?", "What is length?" "What is the number one?" Here we cannot point to anything, although we should point out something - Problem: "nominalization": makes us look for a thing. >Definitions
, >Definability.
- - -
Hintikka I 228
Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing/showing - legacy of the Tractatus "showing" - can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data.
But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. >Learning.
Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: Example: How to show the state of California? (>Definition, >Indicative definition.)
Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this:
I 229
"Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?"
The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity.
For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences.
And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PU §§ 9,38). >Explanation.
I 237
Ostension/Pointing/Indicative Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one and the same gesture can serve for a person's name, the name for a mass term, a number word, etc. - therefore showing cannot connect to reality. It is just a calculus. It is at most, a connection between written or spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19
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