Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Pegasus example: are cases that refer to non-existent objects in everyday language. The problem here is the predicate logical analysis of the corresponding statements. Here the form (Ex) (Fx) (There is an object described by property F) would be needed. However, existence and non-existence would be simultaneously attributed to the object in question. "There is an object that does not exist" is contradictory. On the other hand, the statement "There is a flying horse" is simply wrong. See also existence, existence predicate, non-existence, there is, unicorn example.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Pegasus Example - Dictionary of Arguments
I 306 ff Name: is a general term: > "=Socrates" "Is", the copula, the verb form does not create existence Fx. For us who know that Pegasus does not exist, the phrase "Pegasus flies" may not be true or false. But there are sentences that contain Pegasus, and yet they are neither true nor false for us: For example "Homer believed in Pegasus" but in this case one can be of the opinion that the position is not descriptive. For example in "Pegasus exists" the position of "Pegasus" is purely descriptive: certainly, if something like "Pegasus exists" is true, and then also Pegasus can be replaced by an equivalent description. Measured on this scale, the position is purely indicative but peculiar: I 307 a meaning of "(x)(x exists)" or (Ex)(x exists)" is hardly discernible. Abundance: what embarrasses us here is perhaps too much "abundance" that "exists" if we already have "(Ex)" may not have any independent function in our vocabulary. We understood "exists" as (Ex)(y=x) which applies to everything as well as "x=x". But there are also anomalies in this procedure. It seems strange that "Pegasus exists" should be wrong if "(x)(x exists)" is true and "Pegasus" takes a purely descriptive position. There is something wrong about granting Pegasus the purely descriptive position. I 312 Pegasus Example/Non-Existence/Quine: (Ex) (x = Pegasus) wrong with Pegasus as a singular term - right: with Pegasus as a general term = Pegasus - but: (Ex) (x is Pegasus) is wrong (for non-existence). >Existence/Quine, >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. - - - VII (a) 3 Pegasus/Existence/Quine: if one denies its existence, one does not negate the idea - not the mental entity - Solution: Russell: are descriptions: the unanalyzed part "Author of Waverley" has not, as Wyman ((s) = Meinong) assumed, an objective reference - a whole sentence, containing a description can still be true or false (but only as a complete sentence). Lauener XI 132 Pegasized/Socratized/Quine/Lauener: it should not be possible to eliminate a name in Russell’s way by paraphrasing it by a description. ((s) But this goes very well with Pegasus.) - One can assume an unanalysed, irreducible attribute of the "being-Pegasus", and re-express this with the verb ’is-Pegasus" or "pegasized" - so that we can use singular terms without having to assume that there are things they designate - ((s) "There is nothing that pegasizes".) "~(Ex) Fx". - - - Stalnaker I 55 Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: could exist - the round square could not. Stalnmaker I 65 Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis. Cf. >Unicorn example._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
||
> Counter arguments against Quine
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-09-23