Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Person, philosophy: A thinking and sentient being that distinguishes itself from others. In the course of the history of philosophy, further determinations have been agreed on or disregarded, e.g. rationality, autonomy, not-being-able-to-be-possessed. While the human and his body age, the person has no temporal stages. See also individual, law, continuants, identity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Peter Geach on Person - Dictionary of Arguments

I 246f
Person/personal identity/Locke/Geach: Locke's problem can be reformulated as such: even if every human is a person and every person a human, we cannot conclude that the predicate "___ is the same person as ___" and "___ is the same human as___" fall together in use.
"Every human is a person" is equal to: "Every human is the same person as the one thing or the other"! - according to "every person is a human being" - Geach: Human and person could, according to Locke, simply diverge as different ways to count them, - Human/"surman" - identity"/Locke/Geach: to make sure, Locke assumed (erroneously) that there is no special way that an individual with a proper name had to be identical with itself. - This must be wrong, if the above is correct - because with a name, we are constantly referring to the same thing.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-06-30
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