Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Person, philosophy: A thinking and sentient being that distinguishes itself from others. In the course of the history of philosophy, further determinations have been agreed on or disregarded, e.g. rationality, autonomy, not-being-able-to-be-possessed. While the human and his body age, the person has no temporal stages. See also individual, law, continuants, identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Simons on Person - Dictionary of Arguments
I 207 Person/body/Simons: e.g. operation: the person does not exist during the operation. The operation is carried out on the body, e.g. after amnesia + unlimited capacity to learn: we have a new person in the old body (Simons pro Locke). On the other hand: person: a) to have rights, b ) substrate of change, controlled by psychological laws. Then the definition of a person is: the capacity to characteristic processes, not the current practice of capacity. The person remains the person when he/she sleeps. >Continuants, >Body, >Human. I 211 Person dies/body remains. Coincidence: nevertheless the person has no parts that the body does not have, in particular no intangible parts. >Parts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24