Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
|Phenomenology: is the philosophical direction, which goes back to E. Husserl and which assumes that the phenomena of the objects are what is given to us immediately. According to this assumption, these phenomena are the only evident things to us. See also representation, phenomena, perception, certainty, evidence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Ludwig Wittgenstein on Phenomenology - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 108
HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists. Cf. >Phenomenalism.
I 156 ff
Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects. ((s) for independency of sentences see >Atomism.)
Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings. >Colour.
WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology. >Grammar.
Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names.
Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth.
The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore. >Understanding.
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one.
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.)
WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects. >Quantification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
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