Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Predicates - Dictionary of Arguments
Glüer II 94f Predicates/Davidson: shorter formulations with less relations do not lead to significant different predicates. - Toast-Example: "Strange goings on! Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight. What he did was butter a piece of toast. (1967) (7) Jones buttered in the bathroom at midnight with a knife and deliberately a toast. (8) Jones buttering a toast at midnight (9) Jones is buttering a toast. Toast Example: Shorter formulations with fewer relations do not lead to different predicates. Toast bread Bsp/Davidson/Glüer: it is not clear why a predicate ad infinitum could not be modified: if we had to assume a change of meaning every time, we would be standing on an infinite >lexicon. II 95 Davidson proposes to interpret sentences like (9) as quantification of existence, and predicates like "buttertert" as three-digit, that is, with an additional event place not reflected at the surface of the sentence. Thus (9) is true precisely when (9') (Ex)(butter(Jones,a toast, x)) if there is at least one event x, so that x is a buttering of a toast by Jones. For Davidson, propositions of action have the form of existential quantifying predications, so they are not descriptions of action in the sense that they refer as a whole to a certain event. From such predications, however, singular terms can be formed, e.g. "the churning of the toast by Jones".((s) This is a description) Davidson: "dated particulars" non-repeatable entities with definite spatial temporal localization. More complex ones are to be interpreted as conjunctions. (8') (Ex)(buttered (Jones, a toast,x) and at midnight(x)) ((s) Cf. nowadays >frame theories.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18