Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predication, philosophy: predication is the attribution of a property to an object. See also attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter Geach on Predication - Dictionary of Arguments
I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. I 70 Contradictory predications like "Fa" and "~Fa" refer to a common subject - there are no "contradictory subjects". >Beliefs/Geach, >Belief ascription. I 252 Predication/Geach: can be done without naming: in an if-clause or in an or-clause, a term P can be predicated from a thing without naming the thing with "P". E.g. "If that what the police officer has said, is true, then he was driving faster than 60". This does not name the police officer's sentence as true. - (> Conditional). - Predication/naming: century-old error: the predicate is predicated from the thing - Frege: Difference >Designation, >Denotation, >Predication: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicated in a non-asserting sub-clause (subset) - therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. I 290 Predication/Geach: wrong: to read "SiP" as "a thing is a predicate" - (origin: "Two-Names-Theory, Aristotle) a subject cannot be negated - sentence negation: negation of the predicate. I 291 GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Names-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to the named with relation of the predicate to what it is stated from -> false doctrine of the Trinity. I 295 Prediction/Theology/Thomas Aquinas: the expression after "as" is predicative: e.g., "Christ inasmuch as he is human". - Distinction between subject and predicate, VsTwo-Name-Theory. >Thomas Aquinas. False: Two-Name-Theory: E.g.: "His godly nature is immortal, his human nature is mortal". Aquinas: can distinguish "Christ as human is God". False: Two-name-theory: cannot do this because "human" and "God" are merely two names. >Two name theory: see above). VsOckham: E.g. for him, "humanitas" is not more than "majesty": a disguised name for a concrete thing. Problem: for Ockham, humanity is no longer human when viewed as the Son of God. VsOckham: because it is not genuinely abstract, e.g. the mayor's office becomes the mayor. >William of Ockham. I 300 Predication/Thomas Aquinas/Geach: Subject: refers to a suppositum (an "accepted") predicate: refers to a form or nature. Predication: unequal naming: E.g. "The Prime Minister became Prime Minister" - Nonsense: "which Prime Minister?"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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> Counter arguments against Geach
> Counter arguments in relation to Predication
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19