Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Private language: according to L. Wittgenstein a private language, i.e. a language which an individual develops only for himself and uses to express his feelings, is not possible. (See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, § 243, 258). You cannot give yourself instructions. You could not even understand the language. See also rule following, Kripke's Wittgenstein, priviledged access, Wittgenstein's beetle._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Private Language - Dictionary of Arguments
Newen I 36 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: language that is enriched by expressions of private feelings. - Beetle-Example: the thing in the box is not part of the language game - it could also be missing - or constantly changing - a person alone cannot give a meaning. --- Hintikka I 308 Private Language/private/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing and rules can be private but language games cannot. >Ostension, >Rules, >Rule following, >Language games. I 308/309 Private Language/WittgensteinVsPrivate Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: because you have to understand the whole language-game, not merely its ostensive definition, or the rule for the use of a word, the language cannot be private - if the language games would not take precedence over the rules, private language would be possible. I 309 Private language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: understanding only by whole language-game, therefore not purely phenomenological (private). I 310 Self-talk: early: only possible if I can already play on the (public) language piano. I 311 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is not about the impossibility of a phenomenological language. - We can encourage ourselves, command, blame, etc. - An external researcher could also translate our self-talk. Cf. >Self-talk/Psychology, >Phenomenology. I 314 Private Language/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller/Hintikka: but it is not so that it would be sufficient to only need to pay attention to the role of the utterances in life - as if the private experiences would disappear. -> Beetle-Example: VsStegmüller: Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of private experiences. - The change to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of phenomenological experiences - the objects remain, even if we have to talk in another language about them. Private language argument: should show how we accomplish this feat. I 337 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: wrong: to exclude them because of the impossibility of intersubjective comparisons of private experiences. - One could have a private language in which one only speaks about his beetle - and refuses to translate it into the public language - that would be solipsism. - However, it would not be a unsuitable language philosophy. --- Explanation/(s): Beetle-Example/Wittgenstein: assuming every human has a box with a beetle, which he never shows to anyone else. But he himself can always see if the bug is still in the box. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. By this thing in the box it can be shortened. It lifts off, whatever it is." - The example shows that completely privately held entities do not exist as something objective > More authors on private language > more authors on intersubjectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |