Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Roderick Chisholm on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 16 (33) Proposition/Chisholm: that, what changes when someone else says "I'm hungry" - Thesis: there is no proposition of the 1st person. "I'm F" - no properties like "sitting-next-to-someone". "living opposite" (impure predication). No "nonplatonic entities": "the property of being identical with this thing". >Haecceitism, cf. >Platonism. Primary form: not accepting propositions but self-attribution properties. I 19 Proposition: Subtype of facts. >Facts, >Sentences, >Statements I 20 Properties/Chisholm: Problem: E.g. ""French" is not applicable to itself ": here one cannot say that it has the property, not to itself ... otherwise paradox - solution:" ... has not the property ... "- not every proposition corresponds to a property, therefore not every sentence expresses a proposition. I 27 Proposition/Chisholm: if there is no property of the "sitting-next-to-someone", then there is also no proposition "someone sits next to this man", instead we can define them by properties, we just do not need them in addition. I 66 Proposition/Chisholm: from the proposition "There is something that is F" does not follow that there is the property of being such that there is something that is F (E.g. round square). - Accepting a proposition: Considering that something ... I 86 Proposition/Chisholm: real: e.g. "All human beings are mortal", "There are mountains", "two and two are four" but not: "Socrates is wise", "Emil stands" - attribution: no "accepting of propositions" - "Proper name-fallacy". To believe that there is a proposition "Emil stands" - just as unlikely as the property "to be identical with Emil". I 124 Proposition/Chisholm: involves an eternal object (property or relation), and also a state of affairs. Sentence: does not involve an eternal object. >Ontology/Chisholm._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |