Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Propositions - Dictionary of Arguments
I 332 A sentence is a universal - Value of the variable: is the proposition (object) - remains in place even after a singular term! - Proposition resists change of the truth value. - Proposition remains nameless in x0p. Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!). >Singular Term/Quine I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: a modal sentence is a proposition. I 347 Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? This denotes nothing. I 355 Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (>Gavagai). - Proposition eliminated: synonymy is indefinable - scientific truth is indefinable (only within the theory) (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, §16)(1). I 358 Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different. >Translation/Quine I 358 Proposition as bearers of truth: there is no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves. Sentence: The door is open- bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. What could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there). 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press - - - VII (f) 109 Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements. VII (h) 157 Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition "The number of planets is > 7" - is unequal the proposition "9 > 7". X 32 Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even a variable over an object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (No semantic ascent necessary). - - - XII 39 Sentence/proposition/propositional attitude/translation/ChurchVsQuine: if a sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then there is a problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent. - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. - Quine: I still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: too artificial. >Propositional Attitudes/Quine_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositions
