Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments
I 264 Propositional attitudes: e.g. believes, says, endeavors that, asserts, is surprised, fears, desires, etc... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts that must not be quantified into. (You must not replace a singular term with a term of the same name without affecting the truth value. Also, not a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Cross-references from opaque contexts are also prohibited. (>Opacity/Quine). I 250ff Purely indicative unambiguous (substitutability of identity). Not: Tullius was a Roman is trochaic. The expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative. It is an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is denotation transparent. >Truth Functions/Quine I 263 Opacity: not belief is opaque, but "that" (> Kronecker-example) Opaque context: is a non-denoting function - Frege: Name of a thought, name of a property, name of an individual concept - Russell: propositional attitude. I 367 Propositional attitude: The object can only be a timeless sentence. I 372 Objects of the propositional attitude are eliminated: Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer form Fab a = Thomas, b = (). - But: Fa where F is a complex expression - does not believe term anymore, but operator. I 377 Direct speech: like a birdsong - is also an acting performance, is a propositional attitude. II 153 f Propositional Attitude/Quine: they remain intact but not de re. X 56 Propositional attitude: 1) some authors: that-sentence is the name for a proposition, therefore it is an entity. - QuineVs: Objects of desire should be no entity. 2) others: formation rule that turns two-digit predicates believes+sentence into a one-digit predicate by the interposition of that: believes that y. 3) believes that new category "attitude expression", then we have a formation rule, which turns attitude expression + sentence into a one-digit predicate: believes that Darwin was wrong -predicates: two digits: believes - one digit: believes that Darwin was wrong-/(s) rear position is satisfied. >Predicates/Quine_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositional Attitudes
