Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments
Avr. I 24 Propositional Attitudes/Schiffer: (early): Thesis: mental states such as beliefs and desires should not be construed as attitudes towards sentences. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Propositional attitudes. But it does not follow that the Gricean approach is wrong. At most, the speaker-meaning has no logical priority over the utterance meaning. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Utterance meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositional Attitudes
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24