Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Quidditism, philosophy: comprises the thesis that the relationship between the roles of physical objects such as inertia and the properties such as mass, which realize inertia, is contingent. In other words, quidditism is about the thesis that there is no necessary connection between properties. (See D. T. Locke, Quidditism, 2009). See also causal roles, causal explanation, causality, explanation, best explanation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
D. Lewis on Quidditism - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 104 Quidditism/Schwarz: Thesis: fundamental properties exist regardless of their causal-nomological role. Nomological-structural identical worlds may differ in what role charge 1 plays in them - if quidditism was wrong, laws of nature would be absolutely necessary - Lewis: but they could be different. > haecceitism. Schwarz I 226 Quidditism/Schwarz: Thesis: physics describes only relations of things and properties and do not explain the intrinsic nature. -> Panpsychism: thesis, that nature is mental._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
||
> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Quidditism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18